Are headrests designed to break glass?


The BeyondTrust Privileged Access Management portfolio is an integrated solution that provides visibility and control over all privileged accounts and users.


What is the best car window breaker

Answered By: Jose Rodriguez Date: created: Nov 15 2020

The Best car window breaker on the Market of 2021OUDEW Glass Breaker, Window Hammer. … GoDeCho 4 Pack Car Emergency Escape Window Breaker. … STINGER Ztylus Spring Loaded Window Breaker. … LOYMR 2 Pieces Window Breaker. … Swiss Safe Car Safety Hammer. … IPOW 4 Pieces Window Punch Breaker. … General Tools 7902 4-in-1 Car Escape Tool.More items…

Asked By: Patrick Roberts Date: created: Sep 26 2021

Can you open your car door underwater

Answered By: Gilbert Kelly Date: created: Nov 16 2021

The car door won’t open because of the pressure of the water pushing up against it. A car door WILL open underwater you just need to wait untill the inside of the car is completely submerged with absoloutly no air left and the pressure has equalized.

Asked By: Carl Griffin Date: created: May 07 2021

Break Glass solution

The break–glass solution is based on pre–staged emergency user accounts, managed and distributed in a way that can make them quickly available without unreasonable administrative delay. This solution should be simple, effective, and reliable.

Pre-staging Accounts

Emergency Accounts should be created in advance to allow careful thought to go into the access controls and audit trails associated with them. The following factors should be considered:

  • Username should be obvious and meaningful, such as breakglass01, so the account name would be inappropriate under normal operations and would stand out in audit trails.
  • Strong passwords should implemented, but is important, that they not be so difficult that in an emergency, the user would have trouble entering it.
  • Account Permissions should be set to minimum necessary privilege. Limit emergency access to the minimum data and functionality needed to perform the task. This could potentially include view–only capability, prohibiting access from outside the local console or network, limiting to data acquisition only, or prohibiting access to previously acquired data, but due to the difficulty of anticipating emergency needs, you may choose to allow full access to emergency accounts.
  • Auditing should be enabled if available, to log details of the account usage and details of the work carried out while using the account. Some systems may recognize emergency accounts and raise the system auditing level or increase audit logging of only the emergency accounts.

    Note: Ensure that the individuals who create the accounts are not the ones reviewing the audit trails since this can be a source of abuse.

    The ‘break glass’ accounts and distribution procedures should be documented and tested as part of implementation.

Distributing Accounts

Pre–staged accounts need to be carefully managed to provide timely access when needed. Break–glass requires that the emergency–account details be made available in an appropriate and reasonable manner. These details may be provided on media such as a printed page, a magnetic–stripe card, a smart card or a token. Some distribution possibilities for break–glass emergency accounts include the following:

  • Kept behind glass in a cabinet, where access to the accounts requires literally breaking the glass (similar to a fire extinguisher or alarm), providing an obvious indication that the accounts have been accessed and a deterrent to casual use;
  • Maintained within sealed envelopes, where a broken seal would be an obvious indication that the accounts have been accessed;
  • Locked in a desk drawer that only specific people can access;
  • Sealed and taped to the side of a monitor in a clinical area—visible to many so it will be obvious when it is missing or damaged, or
  • For cases where more than one person is needed to declare an emergency, locked in a safe or cabinet where one person knows the combination or has the cabinet key and a different person has the key to the room.

A best–practice would place the pre–staged emergency accounts into the responsible care of an individual. This Emergency Account Manager would be someone readily available during operating hours and one who understands the sensitivity and priority of the emergency accounts (e.g. a business manager, charge nurse or security officer). The distribution procedure would include a sign–out method requiring that an acceptable form of identification be provided. This identity would be recorded before the accounts are made available. Following such a procedure assures that activities performed using the emergency account may eventually be associated with an authorized individual, creates accountability and can assure non–repudiation.

Monitoring Use of Accounts

The use of emergency accounts needs to be carefully monitored. The audit mechanisms should be used and a procedure defined to examine the security audit trails on a regular basis to identify any use of the emergency accounts. In addition, systems can alert the security administrator in the event an emergency account is activated. These enhanced capabilities are highly desirable, but they are not required for the break–glass mechanism to work. If the system or application software cannot provide an audit trail that shows simple account activity like login attempts, then the use of break–glass needs to be carefully considered before implementing. Break–glass may still remain a valid system, but it will require the use of a manual (e.g. paper–ink) log.

Documentation should describe the intended use of such accounts and the consequences of their inappropriate use. Details should be clearly documented and then communicated to the relevant workforce. It should be clear that all use of emergency accounts is closely monitored. A periodic review and retraining of staff should be done to make sure the break–glass procedure continues to be relevant.

Each use of an emergency account should be reviewed. The use of an emergency account may be valid, or it might indicate a malicious act. Unacceptable use needs to be recorded and acted upon. Frequent use may indicate problems with the normal user authentication mechanism. This regular monitoring of pre–staged emergency accounts should also include exercising some of them to ensure that they do work, and that their use can be detected. This is similar to testing fire alarms, to be sure that they will work in a real emergency.

Cleaning Up After Account Usage

A procedure should be established to clean up after an emergency account has been used. Consider addressing the following:

  • Disable or delete the emergency account(s) that were used to prevent re–use now that the password is known. Some systems may be capable of automatically deactivating emergency accounts after first use or passage of a selectable period such as 8 hours or 1 day. Avoid disabling the account during the period of emergency use.
  • Reconcile the data acquired and audit trails to reflect the proper operator’s name.
  • Make entries in disclosures if appropriate (see HIPAA 5003 policy, procedure and forms).
  • Review activities performed including data acquired/accessed
  • Determine if the emergency account procedure and operation worked effectively and adjust if necessary

Reference: This documentation was written using text from a whitepaper developed by the Joint NEMA/COCIR/JIRA Security and Privacy Committee (SPC) – December 2004.


Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.